ABSTRACT Recently many security protocols have been proposed for road safety applications in Vehicleto-everything (V2X) communications. Most of them, however, do not fully satisfy the requirements of light-weight and fast processing, which are special properties for V2X. Most of the previous authentication protocols assume that a Certificate Authority (CA) is present within the communication range from all the vehicles, which is not practical for moving vehicles. We propose a light-weight security protocol for authentication and privacy protection for V2X. It employs two security hardware devices, Biometric Device (BD) and Tamper Proof Device (TPD), which verifies the driver and securely keeps the keys, respectively. It decentralizes the CA's tasks by locally generating pseudo-identity and private keys to preserve privacy and provide authentication in Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. In addition, we propose an authentication signature protocol using a notion of hash-chain key generation. We implemented the proposed key generation and authentication protocol using NS-3 simulator. Our extensive simulations demonstrated that the proposed authentication protocol significantly enhances the security level while protecting the conditional privacy of vehicles by utilizing anonymous identities. The proposed protocol has a 20% ∼ 85% less communication overhead compared with the previous protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) is receiving increasing attention due to the recent progress in autonomous driving technologies. Each vehicle is equipped with Onboard Unit (OBU) to communicate with other vehicles and with Road Side Units (RSUs) which are available on the road. Dedicated ShortRange Communications (DSRC) standard [1] is utilized to exchange periodically reporting messages between vehicles in large scale networks. Recently, vehicle technologies and applications are targeting road safety with high data exchanging rate to provide alerts about any upcoming crashes in addition to providing mobility information of the surrounding vehicles which enhances the safety of automatic driving. V2X high mobility conditions make vehicles more
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Peter Langendorfer. susceptible to attacks. Hence, V2X critically needs a very strong security system which allows vehicles to communicate safely and securely. Many recently proposed security protocols are trying to enhance the security level by satisfying the requirements and challenges of existing V2X security standards [2] . V2X privacy and authentication are the most important issues which are the primary concerns in this paper. Message and driver's authentication are of the core elements for any V2X security system that allow the drivers to access the network resources at any time. Being authorized would allow a driver to exchange messages and alerts with the vehicles in the driver's communication range.
Preserving the vehicle's privacy by hiding its real identity using pseudo-identities cannot fully hide the vehicles from being tracked as linking two pseudo-identities can ease the discovery of the real identity. Exposing vehicles privacy would allow malicious vehicles to gain access to the private VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ information of other vehicles as well as to the whole V2X system information. In this paper, we are trading off between hiding the real identity of the vehicle and allowing the authorities to keep track of this vehicle under some special conditions like the commitment of a crime or any misbehaving behavior. Non-repudiation is the security property which ensures that no vehicle can deny sending a special message [3] . Any security protocol must support authentication, privacy, and non-repudiation. Many V2X security protocols are depending on traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to support message authentication and integrity. In PKI, message signing is done using a digital signature algorithm in addition to a certificate to authenticate the sender. PKI based solutions are providing a high-security level, however, they are still experiencing high communication overhead due to the large size of the attached certificate in comparison with the original message size [4] . The critical issue concerning previous Conditional Privacy-Preserving Authentication (CPPA) protocols is the dependence of these protocols on the Certificate Authority (CA), which causes high traffic density at the CA and a single failure point.
V2X security is moving towards providing some decentralized authentication and privacy solutions. Recently, the TwoFactor authentication is widely used with online banking, web-based systems and many communication systems [5] . Two-Factor authentication grants service access after passing a two-stage user identification process. In the first stage, each user applies his own credentials then verifies the second credentials that are received from the authentication server as a result of the successful passing of the first stage (e.g., a security code sent over the phone). According to standards and previous related work [6] , Tamper Proof devices (TPDs) are recommended to be installed on vehicles, since it is generally assumed impossible to compromise TPDs. According to WAVE standard [1] , each OBU is equipped with a Hardware Security Module (HSM), a type of TPD, which keeps the master keys secure. A Biometric Device (BD) is also recommended to be installed per each OBU and can provide better safety standards [7] .
TPD and BD will be used as CA's agents to provide security services instead of frequently direct communication to the CA. Using TPD and BD would decentralize the CA's work and reduce the communication burden on the CA.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized security protocol that employs a two-factor authentication concept and a lightweight message signing protocol. The proposed protocol utilizes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [8] to sign and verify each transmitted message via sharing one common pregenerated hash chain (i.e., a chain of keys). In the signing process, the sender vehicle calculates a MAC value using a randomly selected chain key, then attaches the obtained MAC value and the index of the selected key to the message. Accordingly, the receiver vehicle uses the received key index to extract the corresponding chain key and verifies the received MAC value.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the previous V2X security-related implementations. Section III explains the addressed security requirements and mathematical preliminaries. In section IV, we introduce the system model and network structure. Section V explains in details the proposed protocol. In Section VI, security correctness proof is given. Section VII compares the performance of the proposed protocol with other previous works via NS3 simulations. Conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
V2X security has been studied extensively, and hence, a discussion of the studies reported in the literature will be discussed in this section. One of the most important solutions was the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) which was standardized by IEEE1609.2 as the security solution for all V2X safety applications. Although PKI provides message authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation, it has many drawbacks. The major drawbacks of PKI are due to processing delay and communication overhead. The reason is that PKI uses a pair of keys: a private key to sign the message and a public key that is attached with a trusted certificate to allow the receiver to verify the message. Due to the downsides of PKI, Adrian Perrig et al. [9] , proposed an efficient multicast secure source authentication protocol known as TESLA. TESLA protocol is based on MAC algorithms with delayed symmetric key disclosure. TESLA uses symmetric key cryptography which is faster than using a digital signature. TESLA solution got a wide acceptance as an authentication protocol with low communication overhead but it still suffers from the nonrepudiation problem.
Another security protocol called VAST protocol has been reported in [10] . The VAST targets of different V2X applications and provides multi-hop authentication. VAST is based on a mix of TESLA++ (i.e., an updated version of TESLA) and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures. TESLA++ has introduced an efficient solution for preventing Denial of Service (DoS) memory attacks, however, it doesn't provide multi-hop authentication and nonrepudiation. The VAST protocol does not depend on infrastructure which makes it high applicable in rural areas or areas with early deployment phases of V2X. The most critical drawback of this protocol is the long-time delay consumed by the message verification process.
Huang et al. [11] proposed the Anonymous Batch Authenticated and Key Agreement (ABAKA) protocol which supports the multiple-request authentication from different vehicles and establishes different session keys with each vehicle at the same time. ABAKA protocol applies ECDSA protocol to efficiently verify a batch of requests using only one verification operation and negotiate a distinct session key with each vehicle through one broadcasting message. Jia et al. [12] proposed an Efficient Privacy-Preserving Authentication Protocol (EPAS) for V2X by adopting the ECDSA signature and batch verification to provide effective and light authentication. EPAS based emergency communication employs two different design protocols, the first protocol is based on the V2D communication in which the received messages can be verified in a batch by the Disaster Relief Authority (DRA) or can be verified separately. The EPAS second protocol is based on vehicle group communication, as vehicles during the rescue process need to communicate with each other for timely triggered exchanged information.
Kamat et al. [13] adopted a new secure pseudonym and identity-based protocol for V2X to provide a high security and authentication level over traditional PKI and symmetric solutions. Their protocol validity does not need high storage requirements which solves the storage problem of PKI.
In [14] , Xiaodong lin, et al. introduced a privacypreserving and security solution for V2X (GSIS). This protocol is based on identity-based signature and group signatures techniques which provide anonymous and liability authentication but it suffers from a linear increase in the verification time while the number of revoked vehicles increases.
Lu et al. [15] presented a novel adaptive privacy-preserving framework with ID-based authentication for V2X. The selfgenerated and adaptive pseudonyms are used as vehicles identifiers instead of their real identities. The mentioned framework is based on two different signature protocols: the first one is the ID-based signature (IBS) protocol and the second one is the ID-based Online/Offline signature (IBOOS) protocol. In Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication, IBS protocol is used for authentication, while for Vehicle-toVehicle (V2V) IBOOS protocol is used. Reusability is one of the good results of this framework as it can be reused with new IBOOS and IBS protocols for improving security performance.
Zhang et al. [16] proposed a novel Identity-Based Batch Signature Verification (IBV) Protocol for V2X. This solution depends on RSUs to verify multiple and distinct received signatures at the same time which reduces the total verification time. Biswas et al. [17] introduced an ID-based authentication protocol for safety applications in V2X. The proxy signatures are used by the mentioned protocol to provide authentication flexibility. This protocol uses the location information as signer's ID to sign and verify the proxy signatures. In this protocol, the message is valid for the only single zone which is considered as a critical problem.
Bayat et al. [18] proposed a new Conditional PrivacyPreserving Authentication (CPPA) protocol based on bilinear pairing to improve the identity-based CPPA protocol in V2X. However, this protocol cannot prevent message modification attack in which an adversary can repeat the transmission of a previous message after modifying its content. Bayat et al.'s protocol incorporates a Tamper Proof Device (TPD) which is a hardware security module device to store the vehicles pseudonyms and the secret keys of each vehicle.
In He et al.'s protocol [19] , the VANET system's secret key is kept in TPD to prevent attackers from compromising and controlling the whole system. Using one secret system key is considered as a weak point of He et al.'s protocol that allows the adversaries to gather all running cryptographic operations. Once the master private key is compromised, the adversary could control the whole system and causes a lot of damage.
In Wang et al.'s protocol [20] , a lightweight and efficient strong privacy-preserving (LESPP) authentication protocol was proposed for securing VANET communication using lightweight MAC tags and symmetric encryption. LESPP attaches a MAC signature per each message to allow the receiver verifying the message with a low power computation and low memory overhead, however, this protocol can't resist the single point failure problem.
Recently, Zhou et al. [21] protocol introduced an efficient privacy and authentication protocol for V2X based on the key separation approach. Their protocol uses two different types of secret keys which are updated periodically. The first key is issued by a security organization (e.g., CA) while the second key is issued by the vehicle driver. The messages construction is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) security which makes it more efficient and decreases computation rather than using bilinear pairing. However, this protocol supports the installation of TPD devices in each vehicle, it still suffers from modification attacks and system key single point of failure. It has an assumption that the key generation organization is assumed to be fully trusted but if this organization is compromised the whole system will be attacked.
Many security solutions are based on one-system secret keys like 2FLIP protocol which has been proposed by Wang et al. [22] . 2FLIP provides a light-weight protocol for authentication and privacy, however, its revocation process has some limitations. For instance, for multi-drivers' vehicle, 2FLIP cannot recognize which driver misbehaves, and consequently revokes the whole vehicle as a one-unit which leads to unfair revocation. Another limitation is that the CA must hash all vehicles pseudo-identities and store them in vehicles table which is considered a great overhead. 2FLIP depends on a one-system secret key in all cryptographic operations which makes it vulnerable to key compromising attacks.
In this paper, we offer an effective security solution where we utilize the BD and TPD devices to generate random keys and dynamic pseudo-identities. One of the widely used TPD is IBM4758 cryptographic coprocessor [23] , which can store the cryptographic material, sign messages and verify the signature. Using its hardware, TPD can make it extremely difficult for hackers to compromise the cryptograph material kept and calculated only inside the hardware. The proposed protocol supports privacy, integrity, and authentication using a light-weight MAC algorithm and a pre-generated hash table. Avoiding the system key, our protocol eliminates the single point of failure issue which manifests in previous protocols [18] , [22] . The proposed protocol also introduces a notion of a distinct sequence of hash elements to speed up its messages authentication process without sacrificing the security level.
Conventional MAC algorithms require sending the signed key together with the MAC value calculated over the message [24] to allow the receiver to verify the message. The proposed algorithm doesn't require sending the key to improve the security level. Instead, all vehicles store the same hash chain table of n key elements. Each sender randomly chooses one key to sign the message and attaches only the index of the key to the message as a pointer to the key. Using these improved methods, the proposed protocol can significantly improve the computation speed, increase the security level, and reduce the network overhead.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL CONTRIBUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRELIMINARIES
In these sections, we summarize the target security goals that the proposed protocol can satisfy. We propose an efficient certificate revocation protocol that can invalidate only the misbehaving drivers instead of the vehicle entirely. In contrast, the previous protocols revoke the vehicle entirely instead of only the misbehaving drivers by invalidating the whole vehicle as one unit, which can cause unnecessary over-restriction, especially for the car-sharing applications. 5. Strong Message Integrity: Each message includes a short MAC signature and pseudo-identity to ensure the integrity and authentication of each message. At the receiver side, each vehicle calculates the signature and compares it with the attached signature. The receiver then accepts the message, only if the signatures are equal. 6. Non-repudiation and Privacy Preservation: The proposed protocol satisfies the security requirements of preserving privacy while at the same time tracking misbehaving vehicles. The use of the biometric information prevents the drivers from denying sending a harmful message, which fulfills the non-repudiation requirements. 7. Traceability: Anonymity is introduced in many protocols by using an anonymous identity to hide the real identity of each vehicle at the cost of sacrificing the conditional traceability. In contrast, our protocol, while fully supporting anonymity, provides the CA with the ability to track and revoke the misbehavior vehicle by mapping the pseudo-identity of each vehicle with its real identity. This way, it ensures that no vehicle can deny the generation of harmful messages. 8. Periodic Hash Chain Updates: The proposed protocol provides a method of periodic key updates which is scheduled by the CA at the initialization phase.
B. ELLIPTIC CURVE AND HASH CHAIN PRELIMINARIES
As our proposed solution is based on the elliptic curve cryptography and the MAC generation using hash chains, we describe the basic operations of them in this subsection.
1) THEORY OF ELLIPTIC CURVE
An elliptic curve algorithm is expressed in a cubic equation form as in eq. (1).
Here, d, c, b, a and e are real numbers. In the ECC system, the equation is defined as the form of Eq. (2), and Eq. (3). From Eq. (2), Eq (a, b) represents the formula to calculate the elliptic curve with domain parameters a, b over a prime finite field Fq, where q > 3 and a, b ∈ Fq according to Eq. (3).
Eq(a, b) :
Given an integer n ∈ F q and a point P ∈ Eq(a, b), nP defines scalar multiplication over Eq (a, b) . In our protocol, we used a non-singular elliptic curve E/Fq which is described using Eq. (2) and (3). The point P on the elliptic curve forms an additive cyclic group G with order q, while it consists of all points on the elliptic curve E and the point at infinity. In general, the security level of ECC depends on how difficult it is to deduce the elliptic curve coefficients as described below [25] .
2) ECC COMPUTATIONAL PROBLEMS

Definition 1 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)):
Definition 2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP)): Given (P, aP, bP, cP) for any a, b, c ∈ Z * q , decide whether or not cP = abP, i.e., decide whether c = ab mod q or not.
Up to now, there is no polynomial algorithm that can solve the two aforementioned problems [26] . In this paper, the proposed protocol exploits, instead of bilinear pairing, the point of multiplication over ECC which reduces the computational cost. 
3) HASH CHAIN GENERATION
A set of hash functions h(·) is used to generate the One Time Passwords (OTPs). A hash function is generally defined as a one-way function y = h(x) for a given input x. It is known that it is extremely difficult to predict the original input x from the hashed value y. The use of hash chains has been first introduced by Lamport [27] . Later, it was enhanced to implement an OTP system by applying the hash function h(·)N times starting with a seed (s) to generate a hash chain of length N . The result of such recursive hash chain generation produces a set of keys S i illustrated in Fig 1. Each of the private keys is used for calculating MAC value over messages [24] .
IV. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK MODEL
In this paper, we target two vehicular communication modes (V2V and V2I). Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) mode is supported only when the RSU exists to allow vehicles connection to the CA. The network system model consists of a CA, a set of RSUs installed on the roads and a varying number of vehicles on the road. The role of CA includes the initialization phase authentication, the system key updating process, and the vehicles revoking. The system model is not fully depending on the CA since vehicles are equipped with BD and TPD devices for authentication parameters generation. As shown in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b , the proposed network model can support authentication for messages and identities in any vehicular communication application especially the multidrivers service.
It is assumed that CA is a fully trusted certificate authority organization with unlimited memory storage and computation resources. CA handles many tasks like vehicles registration, key management, and conditional traceability of vehicles. In addition, we assume that the RSUs are deployed on the roadside and can communicate with a CA using a wireline internet connection. An RSU has a wide communication range and enough memory storage to offer security services to the running vehicles on the road. Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU which includes a hardware security module called TPD device with addition to BD device. An OBU in each vehicle periodically broadcasts a standard safety message consisting of the current time, the vehicle's position, speed, direction, acceleration, and road traffic events. These safety messages can provide the driver of each vehicle warning of upcoming dangers or can assist autonomous vehicles to avoid accidents. 
B. ADVERSARY MODEL
An adversary is an entity attempting to compromise the security by monitoring or modifying the data transferred through the communication channel. The adversary may have powerful communication abilities and computation resources. An adversary can also tamper messages, drop packets, replace the original messages, and delay the transmission of messages. As we previously discussed, in the proposed method, the cryptographic materials and secret keys are saved only in TPDs. An adversary may disguise itself by using another vehicle's valid identity to send harmful or false messages without being detected. The adversary may try to use a stolen TPD to impersonate other drivers and generate a large number of invalid or legitimate messages to disrupt the V2X services. We assume that the adversary can affect the system with some defined attacks as explained in section (VI). We assume that the adversary can generate replay attack, key modification attack, DOS attack, and message modification attacks.
V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol initially generates a hash chain using an initial secret key. Using a pre-defined hash algorithm, the TPD in each vehicle securely generates a hash chain of n elements that represent the signing keys. A vehicle signs each message using one of these keys and attaches the obtained signature to the message and only the index i for the key K i . K i is one hash element from the generated hash chain instead of the actual key. At the receiver side, only registered vehicles that have the pre-generated hash table can retrieve the signing key K i from the index i and verify the signature. The receiver calculates the MAC value over the received message and accepts the message only if the calculated MAC matches the received one. The proposed protocol is composed of the following processes: vehicle and driver registration, BD device authentication, TPD device authentication, message authentication, system key update, and certificate revocation as described in Fig 3 . Table 1 describes the notations used in the proposed algorithms. In the following subsections, we provide a detailed description of each process of the proposed protocol.
A. VEHICLE AND DRIVER REGISTRATION
We assume that each vehicle using the proposed protocol is equipped with a bd device and all legitimate drivers are registered at the ca with their biometric information. to support multiple drivers effectively for the same vehicle as in car-sharing applications, our method requires each driver to register at the ca individually. once the ca approves the driver registration, it configures bd with the following two functions:
• Password verification function Pv i,u : verifies the driver's login to the BD.
• Password maintenance function Pk i,u : updates the password when the driver biological information changed. CA configured the BD device with Pv i,u , Pk i,u to verify and keep the driver biological password, then keep evidence of each biological password for future tracking. In Fig. 4 , the CA as a managing authority, picks a two large prime numbers p, q and a non-singular elliptic curve E defined by Eq. (2) .
Through a secure channel (e.g., submit information personally), each driver must provide the vehicle's real identity, 
B. BIOMETRIC DEVICE AUTHENTICATION
Before driving, each driver logs in to the biometric device, BD, using his biological password, pw i,u (e.g. a fingerprint scan or iris scan). Pv i,u and Pk i,u that are previously configured by the CA are used to verify and keep the driver's biological identity. Each BD i verifies the driver identity by calculating the biometric login information {β * i,u , PID init , Pv * i,u } using the verifying functions described above. If the driver is a legitimate user, the BD automatically activates the TPD and allows the driver to send and receive messages. Fig. 5 shows the BD i login calculation steps.
C. TPD DEVICE AUTHENTICATION
In this subsection, we explain the preparation steps of the TPD device to start signing and verifying the transmitted messages. TPD speeds up the required processing by providing an offline generation of pseudo-identities and hash elements as shown in Fig 6 . The TPD operations are described below.
1) PSEUDO-IDENTITY GENERATION MODULE
To provide anonymity, each TPD generates a group of pseudo-identities with each identity composed of two parts PID 1 and PID 2 . These pseudo-identities can hide the real identity of the vehicle from other vehicles and prevent the tracking attacks. We define the structure of the pseudoidentity in a way that allows only the CA to retrieve the real identity at any time. In the revocation subsection (subsection B), we show how the CA maps the real identity of the vehicle to any of its pseudo-identities. Eq. 4, 5, and 6 show the required logical operations to generate the pseudo-identities.
Here R i ∈ z * is a random number for each generated pseudoidentity. PID i consists of a dynamic part PID 1 and static part PID 2 ; PID 1 is a hashing value of a random number R i , while PID 2 is calculated by an XOR of the initial pseudoidentity of each vehicle and the concatenation of PID 1 and system key k s . PID i in this way satisfies the anonymity condition and provides a practical revoking function. The static part PID 2 allows the CA to find the real information of drivers using PID init as an index for the vehicle information table, while the dynamic part PID 1 hides the real identity of the vehicle to support anonymity.Each vehicle generates n pseudo-identities before starting communication to save the generation time for PIDs on the fly. In this paper, we propose an efficient and practical revoking method that can eliminate the search time for long certificate blacklists. The proposed revoking method, unlike conventional solutions, does not require periodic updates for the certificate lists at all vehicles. The proposed method allows the CA to revoke the misbehaving vehicle by sending a revoking message to the TPD device of the misbehaving vehicle. When a misbehaving vehicle identity (PID i is reported to the CA, it uses Eq. (5) and (6) to find the value of PID init , then uses PID init to search the v-info table and map it to the real vehicle identity. The proposed pseudo-identities generation method can achieve anonymity and supporting efficient revoking.
2) HASH CHAIN GENERATION MODULE
During the vehicle registration phase, the CA has stored the secret system key, k s , in the OBU of each vehicle. Using the installed secret key k s as a seed, this module pre-calculates a hash of n elements by iteratively calculating a pre-stored one-way hash function, H (). VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 7. The hash chain generation using system key k s .
The pre-calculated hash chain is stored in each registered vehicle. Each element of the chain is used later as a signing key for message authentication. Fig 7. illustrates an example of the hash chain generation process. Each vehicle regenerates the hash chain when the CA updates the secret system key, k s .
D. MESSAGE SIGNING AND VERIFYING
After a successful driver login and hash key generation, the TPD device can sign and verify each transmitted message. Eq. 7 defines the message signature formula that is similar to a conventional MAC operation.
The parameters of Eq. 7 are described as follows: mac ki : The MAC value for message m using a signing key of ki.
Sig ki : The output signature of the MAC operation is truncated to only 12 bytes. Although the actual length of the hashed values using HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm is 20 bytes, according to the mentioned MAC truncation operation in [28] , we keep only the least significant 12 bytes. If T s is invalid, v j rejects the message; otherwise, v j verifies the signature of the received message. v j queries the stored hash table using the received key index, k index . Then, v j calculates the signature of the received message, Sig * ki , as in Eq. 8.
If the calculated signature, Sig * ki , is equal to the received one, Sig ki , the receiver vehicle, v j , accepts the message.
E. THE PERIODIC UPDATING OF THE SYSTEM KEY
The proposed solution assumes that the secret system key, k s , is physically secured by the BD and TPD devices. For instance, if an illegitimate user tries to access the BD with wrong biometric information, the TPD after the specified number of trials flushes all stored information including the system key, k s ., Nevertheless, we can enhance the security level of the proposed system by periodically updating the system key. This periodic update takes place according to a predefined agreement between CA and all registered vehicles. The update operations are described as follows:
• CA generates a new key k u s .
• Encrypt the updated key k u s using the current system key k s as follows:
• CA signs the encrypted key using its secret identity SID CA , sig c = sign SID CA (C), and then broadcasts the signed encrypted key, followed by the signature (C, sig c , T u s ) to all vehicles in the network.
• The vehicles that received the key first verify the timestamp, T u s , by checking its freshness and periodicity.
• The vehicles then verify the signature over the message using the public key of CA, PK s . The vehicles, then, extract the new key by decrypting C using the old system key, k s .
• After updating the system key, the TPD device of each vehicle generates a new hash chain of length n using the new system key, k u s , and stores k u s as shown in Fig 9. 
F. EFFICIENT VEHICLE REVOCATION PROCESS
The most common means of certificate revocation methods in V2X is the use of Certificate Revocation List (CRL). In this method, a CA sends a list of the revoked certificate to all registered vehicles. Each vehicle needs to continuously obtain the updated CRL list from the CA, whereby it checks whether a certificate is revoked or not by searching for the certificate's ID in this list. Checking the vehicles' revoked certificates using the CRL method leads to long delays based on the CRL list size. The CRL list size increases as the number of revoked certificates grow. The CRL list size can range between several bytes to megabytes as mentioned in [29] . The conventional CRL method is not suitable for large V2X networks, as it incurs excessive overhead. In contrast to the traditional CRL revocation mechanisms, this paper introduces a simple and efficient revocation protocol. In this paper, we are not focused on misbehavior detection techniques. Instead, we utilize existing protocols for detecting misbehaviors. Interested readers, can refer to such a previous work of [30] . Once a vehicle is detected as misbehavior to be revoked, the CA decides to isolate this vehicle from the system by notifying the other vehicles with a revocation list. As an example of misbehavior detection scenario, if a vehicle receives false information or too many requests from a specific vehicle within a short time, it reports the pseudo-identity PID i of this vehicle as misbehavior to the CA. We propose an efficient revocation protocol to revoke only the accused driver without affecting the other drivers for the same vehicle. CA has a database of all vehicles information and driver's real identities. Once CA receives the invalid vehicle identity PID i , CA extracts PID init and finds the real driver identity by searching v-info table -a fast search engine based on contents addressed memory (CAM) [31] . CA Extracts PID init using Eq. (4) ∼ (6), and maps it to the real vehicle identity RID i and the biological password β i,u of the driver.
CA directly communicates with the TPD device of the misbehaving vehicle by sending a signed a revocation message that contains the initial pseudo-identity of the revoked vehicle (PID init , Sig rev ). Here Sig rev is a digital signature of CA, which signs initial pseudo-identity PID init by CA's secret identity (SID CA )
When the TPD in the revoked vehicle receives this message, it verifies the legitimacy of the sender, if it's legitimate, TPD erases all the cryptographic materials previously configured in the TPD i during the registration phase. Whereas the previous work called 2FLIP protocol [22] revokes the whole vehicle regardless of the misbehaving driver, our protocol can revoke the misbehaving driver individually without affecting the other drivers for the same vehicle.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the security functions provided by the proposed protocol compared with recent security protocols that are based on TPD and BD devices.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we show how the proposed protocol can accomplish the required security functions: driver authentication, message authentication, non-repudiation, privacy-preserving, unlinkability, traceability, and system update.
1) DRIVER AUTHENTICATION
BD device verifies the user legitimacy by comparing the biometric information of each driver with the pre-stored biometric credentials. Based on the verifying function Pv i,u and the initial pseudo-identity PID init , each BD device calculates the following:
, then the driver is authorized to login the TPD. The authentication phase between the BD and TPD increases the security level by preventing unauthorized drivers from sending messages or activating the TPD.
2) MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
We proposed a novel MAC algorithm based on the hash chain table and one common secret key. The traditional MAC algorithm requires sending the MAC key with the signed message. In contrast, the proposed protocol introduces a pregenerated hash table that allows each vehicle to send only the key index. Each receiving vehicle uses this key index to look up the hash table and verify the received message. Using a hash chain table with indexed keys increases the immunity to key compromising attacks, and also can avoid disclosing any information about the key. Message authentication steps are described below: A sender vehicle v i calculates a MAC signature over the transmitted message using HMAC-SHA256 algorithm Sig i = mac ki (PID i ||m i,j ||Ts).
• v i attaches Key index T s and PID i to the message • Received vehicle v j verifies the time stamp Ts to avoid the replay attacks. Ts defines the validity time of the pseudo-identity. v j accepts the message if Ts is valid.
• Searching the hash table using the attached key index for k i , v j calculates the signature over the received message using Sig * i = mac ki (PID i ||m i,j ||Ts). Then v j compares the calculated MAC value against the received one.
• v i accepts the message if Sig * i == Sig i otherwise, reject the message. Thus, attackers cannot modify or alter a valid signature in polynomial time. Hence, message authentication and integrity are ensured. VOLUME 7, 2019 3) NONREPUDIATION Each message is transmitted with an attachment of pseudoidentity which is generated by the corresponding TPD of each vehicle. The pseudo-identity is generated using the vehicle's initial identity, the system key, and a timestamp.
Due to this combination, no vehicle or driver can deny the transmission of a message through its corresponding TPD. With the help of timestamp, it can never deny the time of message generation. Thus, nonrepudiation is guaranteed.
4) PRIVACY-PRESERVING
We proposed a method of using pseudo-identity PID i to hide the real identity of each vehicle, which allows them to communicate anonymously and thus avoid vehicle tracking. Using BD and TPD allows each driver to authenticate his real identity by entering the biological password. If the identity of the driver is legitimate, the driver can activate TPD and sends messages without exposing the real identity of the vehicle. In our proposed protocol, we achieve the privacy of each vehicle, while allowing the CA to track the misbehaving vehicles using our revocation process. Even if BD or TPD are stolen, the driver's critical information is still preserved, as the activation of both devices requires the actual driver biometric information.
5) UNLINKABILITY
Instead of attaching the long size high-cost pseudonym certificates with each message to provide anonymity. Our protocol can preserve the vehicle's privacy using a short size low-cost random numbers called pseudo-identities to hide the real vehicle identity. While the conventional protocols periodically change pseudonym certificates like [32] , [33] according to a predefined change and swapping mechanism, our proposed protocol dynamically generate the pseudo-identity numbers on the fly. After verifying the biometric information of each driver, the transmitter TPD device is activated to generate a dynamic identity per each message, while the receiving TPD authenticates the sender's message integrity. Using dynamic pseudo-identity in the proposed protocol can prevent any adversary from linking two identities and discovering the sender's real identity at a much lower computation overhead than the conventional protocols. The proposed protocol uses extensive pseudo-identity change which makes it hard for the attacker to link the newly changed pseudo-identity with the old one which preserves both the location and identity privacy. Due to the inherent weakness in the V2X standard's beaconing protocol, an attacker may be able to track a vehicle position. Our protocol, however, never reveals the real identity of a vehicle, since the real identity is securely stored only in the V-info table at CA. Each pseudo-identity is composed of two parts: The first part is PID 1 = h(R i ) with a random number R i changing every time a vehicle transmits a message. The second part is PID init ⊕ h(PID 1 ||k s ) where a fixed value PID init allows CA to track the vehicle, while the full pseudoidentity PID i = PID 1 ||PID 2 makes it extremely hard to link it with the previous pseudo-identity. The proposed pseudoidentity structure can satisfy the anonymity since it allows only CA to retrieve the identity to process vehicle tracking and revocation.
6) TRACEABILITY
In the proposed protocol, CA extracts the real identities of the vehicles by searching the vehicle information table (v-info  table) . The dynamic pseudo-identity PID i of the vehicle is obtained by using Eq. (4) ∼ (6). CA extracts the initial vehicle identity and finds the real identity RID i by looking up the v-info table. The CA's conditional traceability is satisfied, while vehicle privacy is still preserved.
7) SECURE SYSTEM UPDATE
We introduce a periodic system key updating protocol to protect the system from key compromising attacks by allowing only the registered vehicles to generate a new hash chain table. CA generates a new system key k u s , and encrypts it using C = Enc k s (k u s ||ID CA ||T u s ) with the current system key k s and the current key timestamp T u s . CA signs the encrypted message using the secret identity SID CA , attach a signature sig c , and broadcasts it to all registered vehicles. Only the registered vehicles can verify the signature, decrypt the key message using the previous system key, and then update the hash chain table.
B. RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS
The proposed protocol is secure against many well-known attacks described below:
1) REPLAY ATTACK
The proposed protocol ensures the freshness of each transmitted message by attaching the current timestamp of the TPD device. For example, its message format is {PID i , Sig ki , m i,j , Key index , Ts}, where Ts is the attached time stamp. All vehicles must be synchronized to support accurate time stamps and resist against the replay attacks. The synchronization of OBU's clock can be provided by GPS devices.
2) MODIFICATION ATTACK
In the proposed protocol, the message integrity is achieved by attaching asignature Sig ki = mac ki (PID i ||m i,j ||Ts), which is calculated using the HMAC algorithm with a random key. The receiver recalculates the signature over the received message using Sig * i = mac ki (PID i ||m i,j ||Ts). Only when signature Sig * i is identical to the transmitted signatureSig i , the receiver accepts the message. In this way, by verifying the signature of each message our protocol ensures the message integrity and prevents-message alteration.
3) SYSTEM KEY COMPROMISING ATTACKS
In this paper, we proposed a Message Authentication method that employs the key index for each message. By attaching the key index to the message, it allows the receivers to lookup the pre-stored hash table in the receiver vehicle without exposing the actual key. In contrast, the conventional MAC algorithm requires sending the key with a signature to allow the receivers to verify the message, which makes it vulnerable to sniffing key attacks.
4) DOS ATTACKS
The proposed protocol can enhance the resistance against denial of service (DOS) attacks. Conventional methods like TESLA protocol [9] , often require a large buffer to store the incoming packets for a long time until the sender discloses the key to allow the receiver to verify the messages. In our protocol, each TPD device stores a hash chain of n entries during the initialization phase, which requires a significantly smaller buffer and lower calculation overhead for MACs than the conventional methods.
5) MAN IN THE MIDDLE ATTACK
In the proposed protocol, it is extremely difficult to retrieve the system key by sniffing the key index since only the registered vehicles can map the key indices to the hash key values. In the proposed protocol, furthermore, even if the attacker sniffs the initial pseudo-identity of any vehicle, it cannot retrieve any information about the real identity of the vehicle. In summary, the security level of the proposed protocol is compared against the previous work [18]- [21] that support the same network topology and also employ a TPD device.See Table 2 .
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol, we implemented it in an NS3 simulator using a cryptography library called MIRACL [34] . To demonstrate the performance comparison, we also have implemented a set of previous protocols using the same NS-3 simulator platform [35] . We conducted an extended set of simulations using a wide range of example networks. We first compare the performance of the proposed protocol with the previous works [18] - [22] in terms of communication overhead and computation time. We then measured the average message delay and the average message loss ratio for all considered protocols. Table 3 shows the average execution time of primary cryptographic operations in our simulator. The simulations are conducted in a hardware platform employing an Intel Core I7-4770 processor with 3.40 GHz clock, and the main memory of 4 GB. In the simulations, we adopted the same experimental environment as [19] to make a direct comparison. Many V2X security protocols such as [18] are based on bilinear pairing to achieve their security requirements.
A. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD OF TPD BASED PROTOCOLS
Since they are based on symmetric bilinear pairing to generate the cryptographic material with a security level of 80 bits, it would take 2 80 trials for a hacker to break the security strength of these generated elements. The bilinear pairing can be defined by Eq (11) .
Here, G 1 indicates an additive group constructed by a generator P with order q on a supersingular elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + x mod p with degree 2. Here p denotes a 512-bit prime number, while q indicates a Solinas prime number of 160 bits. On the other hand, many other security protocols such as [19] are still using the traditional elliptic curve to construct their solutions While the bilinear pairing methods suffer from high computations cost due to their excessive complexity, other approaches such as [20] , [21] , and our proposed protocol provide lightweight solutions. To compare with the previous works based on bilinear pairing and ECC, we implemented the simulator using a security level of 80 bits.
In addition, the simulator employs an additive group G of order q, which is expressed by a non-singular elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, where p, q are 160-bit prime numbers and a, b belongs to the finite field z * q . The computation cost of [19] requires three ECC multiplication and three hashing to sign one message with a total time cost, 3T M −ECC+ 3T h = 1.338 ms. The verification cost for [19] is calculated using three ECC multiplication, two-point addition, and two hashing operations. Therefore, the computation cost of one message is 3T M −ECC + 2T a−ECC + 2T h = 1.3356 ms. The above calculation ignores the computation time for concatenation and XOR operations since their computation time is negligibly short.
The computation cost of the following security protocols [18] , [20] , and [21] , have been analyzed in the same manner using the listed calculations in Table 4 . The proposed protocol requires only negligible hash and MAC operations to authenticate messages with a little computation time. Any receiver can verify the message by calculating the MAC value using the key retrieved from an already stored hash chain. We assume that the BD device initially does the driver's authenticity then it activates the TPD to send and receive messages.
According to the standard DSRC communication requirements of V2X, each vehicle broadcasts beacon message every 100 or 300 ms. Table 5 compares the computation speed in term of the number of messages that can be signed and verified per second. It shows that the proposed protocolachieves two orders of magnitude higher speed than the previous methods that we experimented. To calculate the number of messages that need to be verified by each vehicle, we consider a high-vehicle-density scenario of 180 vehicles within a 300 m communication range. Assume that each vehicle sends a packet every 300 ms, so each vehicle must verify about 600-2000 messages per second [36] . From Table 5 , we find that [19] and the proposed protocol can verify 600 messages per second, while only the proposed protocol can verify 2000 messages per second.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD OF TPD BASED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we present the communication cost analysis of the proposed protocol and compare it with the previous work [18] - [21] . In this paper, we compare two cryptography methods: one based on bilinear pairing and the other based on the traditional elliptic curve. According to the previously mentioned parameters of the bilinear and elliptic methods, we calculate the size of the cryptographic elements. For the bilinear method, we used an additive group G1 to support 128 bytes elements size. For the elliptic curve method, we used an elliptic group G to support 40 bytes element size, In addition, we assume that the output size of the hash function is 20 bytes, the size of elements in the finite field Z * q is 20 bytes, and the timestamp size is 4 bytes.
To compare the overhead with the protocols in [18] - [21] in Table 6 , we analyzed the message structures of the 4 previous protocols. The message structure of [19] is expressed by Eq (12). Eq. (13) contains a signature σ i ∈ Z * q , a pseudo-identity AID i , a random number Ri ∈ G, and a timestamp T i . Here, AID i = {AID 1 i , AID 2 i }, which belongs to the elliptic curve group G, The total communication overhead of one message in the previous method of [19] is calculated by Eq.12 as 20+40 × 3 + 4 = 144 bytes.
In [18] , the broadcast message parameters are expressed using Eq (13) .
Here, mac m,ts represents a MAC signature of 20 bytes over the message, while EPID i,ts ∈ G represents the vehicle pseudo-identity of 40 bytes. The total communication overhead of sending one message, therefore, is 60 bytes according to Eq. (13) .
For the protocol proposed in [18] , the parameters for transmitted messages are calculated using Eq (14):
Here, a pseudo-identity ID i ∈G1 consists of two parts (ID 1 i , ID 2 i ): a message signature σ i ∈ Z * q, and a timestamp T i . Its communication overhead of one message is 128 × 2 + 20 + 4 = 280 bytes.
In [21] , the transmitted message structure is calculated using Eq (15):
Here, θi, wi, σ i are random numbers that belong to Z * q , T i indicates the timestamp, while U i ∈ G denotes a random number. The total communication overhead for the message of Eq. (15) is 40 + 20 × 3 + 4 = 104 bytes.
For our proposed protocol, the transmitted message structure is represented by Eq (16) .
Here, PID i ∈ Z * q represents the pseudo-identity, while Sig ki indicates the 12 bytes truncated signature over the message. Key index represents the index of the hashed key, while T S represents the time stamp. The total communication overhead of one message is 20+12+4+4 = 40 bytes. Table 6 compares the communication overhead of the 5 protocols. The proposed protocol exhibits 20% ∼ 85% lower communication overhead than the previous methods in Table 6 . 
C. OVERHEAD OF BD BASED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we compare the proposed protocol with the 2FLIP protocol [22] . 2FLIP is a protocol that utilizes biometric device authentication. To calculate the computation time and communication overhead of 2FLIP, we use the cryptographic calculations listed in Table 3 . Table 7 summarizes the computation time of the proposed protocol and 2FlIP for the following seven functions: message signing, verifying, key updating, hash chain updating, and vehicle revocation.
In 2FLIP, the message structure is calculated using Eq (17) .
Here, PID i,ts represents the dynamic-identity of each vehicle and σ i,ts indicates the MAC signature over a message m. The signing computation cost of one message in 2FLIP is (7Th + TMAC), while the verifying cost is (2Th + TMAC) as mentioned in [22] . The proposed protocol uses one MAC signature (TMAC) for signing and verifying messages. Similarly, the computation times of the key update and revocation are listed in Table 7 .
It can be observed from Table 7 that the computation time of the proposed protocol is substantially shorter than the 2FLIP protocol in the functions for message signing, verifying, key updating and revoking. The communication cost of the proposed protocol and 2FLIP is listed in Table 8 . In 2FLIP, a message consists of {PID i,ts , σ its , T s , m} with PID i,ts of 23 bytes, σ i,ts of 20 bytes, and timestamp of 4 bytes leading to a size of 47 bytes. The security function coverage is summarized in Table 9 .
From Table 9 , we can observe that 2FLIP cannot support some security functions such as traceability, resistance to modification attacks, and key compromising attacks. 2FLIP uses a single system key for vehicles authentication which makes 2FLIP vulnerable to key compromising attacks. In contrast, the proposed protocol employs n hashed distinct keys without exposing the system key, and thus it can resist system key attacks.
D. SIMULATION RESULTS
We have conducted an extensive set of simulations to compare the proposed protocol performance with previous protocols of [18] - [22] . We have implemented the proposed protocol using the miracle library on the NS-3 simulator. We implemented all cryptographic operations described in the above section including signing and verifying the messages for the previous protocols as well as the proposed protocol. We conducted simulations using Manhattan grid mobility to model an urban scenario of vehicular networks. Table 10 . The performance of each protocol has been measured in terms of transmission delay and message loss ratio, which are described below.
1) AVERAGE TRANSMISSION DELAY
It represents the average end-to-end delay consisting of the singing time, transmission time, and verifying time. It is calculated using Eq. (18): 
2) AVERAGE MESSAGE LOSS RATIO
From the security application's perspective, the received message might be dropped due to the limited size of the application buffer. As the signature verification function consumes time, the application buffer may overflow if the message arrival rate is higher than the message processing rate. Thus, we calculate the average loss ratio by Eq. (19) .
Msg n dropped kn k=1 Msg n arrived (19) Here, Msg n dropped denotes the number of messages dropped at the application buffer of vehicle n, while Msg n arrived denotes the total number of messages received by vehicle k.
In this paper, we do not consider the message loss due to the wireless medium. Instead, we only consider the message loss caused by the application buffer overflow at the receiver vehicles. Fig. 11 illustrates the simulation results of the average transmission delay over a wide range of the number of vehicles in the network. While Bayat [18] , He [19] , Zhou [21] show a steep increase in the average transmission delay as the number of vehicles in the network increases, the other protocols exhibit relatively flat delay. The proposed protocol gives a significantly shorter delay than all the previous protocols tested.
It is important to keep the end-to-end delay as low as possible especially in V2X reporting and safety applications. The average message delay of Bayat et al., [18] protocol shows the longest delay, which is due to the fact that its pairing operation consumes a lot of singing and verifying delay as listed in Table 5 . The end-to-end delay of the other protocols [19] - [21] are relatively close since their protocols employ ECC cryptographic operations, and thus consume less singing and verifying time than pairing operations. Fig. 11 also shows that the proposed protocol slightly outperforms 2FLIP, since it has a lower computation cost for both signing and verification processes (see Table 8 ). For instance, for a vehicle density of 80 vehicles, the proposed protocol incurs a delay of 304 µsec, while 2FLIP incurs around 368 µsec. As shown in Table 7 , for the computation cost of singing one message, the proposed protocol consumes only TMAC = 0.006, whereas 2FLIP consumes 7Th + TMAC = 0.0587. In addition, at the receiver side, the proposed protocol consumes only TMAC = 0.006, whereas 2FLIP consumes 2Th + TMAC = 0.0287. Fig. 12 illustrates the average packet loss ratio for the protocols that are implemented and tested.
In Fig. 12 , for a vehicle density of 80 vehicles, [18] shows the highest loss ratio (72%). Its excessive loss ratio is due to the buffer overflow that happens because its message arrival rate is much higher than the message verification rate. Therefore, the loss ratio is proportional to the computation cost of signature verification. In the same context, He et al. [19] , Wang et al. [20] and Zhou et al. [21] show lower loss ratios as they have lower computation cost for signature verification. The proposed protocol and 2FLIP provide zero losses for the range of vehicles densities and the application buffer size of 8 Kbytes in the simulations that we have tested. As the signature verification requires only 304 µsec, the application buffer does not overflow for any of the simulated vehicle densities. The lightweight verification method of the proposed protocol substantially reduces the processing delay, and consequently, it can prevent the message loss entirely.
The above simulation results demonstrate that the hash chain based key generation and the lightweight signature computation of the proposed protocol can significantly reduce both computation and network overhead without compromising the security level.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a decentralized light-weight authentication protocol for V2V communications. Our protocol preserves privacy by using self-generation of pseudoidentities instead of traditional digital certificates. Moreover, the proposed protocol integrates the BD and TPD security devices with the pre-stored shared hash chain of authentication keys. The hardware security devices play the role of CA agents, and generate pseudo-identities and corresponding private keys to authenticate the messages and keep the driver's privacy. The use of pre-stored shared hash chain offered a new message integrity mechanism that calculates a signature over each message using the hashed keys without disclosing the keys. The proposed protocol satisfies important security requirements such as anonymity, unlinkability, and conditional traceability. It also provided a misbehavior revocation mechanism that reports the misbehaviors' pseudo IDs, so the CA can determine the real identity of from the pseudo IDs. In the extensive simulation experiments, our protocol outperformed the recently published protocols in the computation cost of message authentication and verification. We have shown that the proposed protocol can sign 60,000 messages per second which is up to 55 times higher speed than the previous protocols tested. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed protocol is well suited to time-critical applications such as large scale V2X networks. The revocation method introduced in this paper supports the multi-driver revocation scenario since it revokes only the accused driver by allowing the CA to revoke only the driver's pseudo-identity. 
